Lessons from the Trenches: Mastering Tech M&A, Integration, and Carve-Out Strategies Part 2

Trends in software valuation: EBITDA vs. revenue multiples

In software, I’m noticing a trend from EBITDA multiples to revenue multiples. It’s a combination now. It has to pass the smell test across the margin profiles—gross margin, OPEX, net income, and EBITDA. 

From there, the jump to an enterprise value-to-sales or price-to-sales multiple happens when a company is still investing in growth.

At that point, the key question is whether you’re getting a return on your investment dollars. That’s the part people keep missing. For example, if a company launches a new product and says that’s why they’re not profitable this year, I’ll ask when the product launched and how many units have been sold since. Is execution working or not?

Another issue is companies claiming 50–100% year-over-year growth, but it’s all inorganic—they’re acquiring companies without integrating them. You see it in public and private markets. You visit their website and see competing products because they haven’t addressed integration. I’m not giving a premium sales multiple in that case.

However, if growth is organic and driven by strong customer demand, I’ll consider a premium multiple, but it’ll be informed by all other metrics in the space.

You sometimes have to model transparency. If you have an advisor, you can ask the banker questions like, “Why is this company so profitable all of a sudden?”

I’ve seen cases where software companies added a payments feature, taking a 2.5% transaction fee. That boosts the bottom line, but their customer base is shrinking, and the strategy isn’t stable. In that case, I’d remove that piece and ask, “How are you adding new logos? Are you expanding? Have you maxed out your total addressable market?”These details are crucial to understanding the real picture.

Venture capital vs. private equity mindsets

There’s a clear difference in mindset between venture capital and private equity. Venture capital focuses on revenue-based investments and growth metrics, while private equity emphasizes bottom-line profitability, especially as you move upstream.

Venture capital has done an incredible job funding innovation. Without that asset class, we wouldn’t have many great companies.

But for long-term viability, a company must figure out how to operate profitably over time. In the seed, Series A, or Series B stages, profitability isn’t a focus. However, when moving toward a growth round—cleaning up the cap table and enabling early investors to exit at a 5x or 10x return—financial viability becomes essential.

At that point, investors want to see whether the company can operate independently without needing additional cash to fund operations. Risk capital has done its part by then, and the company must prove it can survive. 

The good thing is the people are providing debt. They do their own homework. They look at the company's ability to pay the interest and pay down the debt. It's actually nice to have debt on the table because that adds just another level of due diligence. What you don't want to do is have a debt with a very high kind of interest rate or a coupon. 

Who is lending on software deals

In the context of software deals, there's a category called venture debt, which is an emerging asset class. It's maturing now. Rates can vary. It could be prime plus two, three, or four. It's not too bad. M plus is a good sign. It depends on the company's risk profile. The company needs to have a decent amount of equity on their balance sheet.

In software, specifically, there needs to be recurring revenue. You’ll typically get lent based on a multiple of recurring revenue because lenders can see that the company can actually pay using that revenue stream. The equity piece sits on top of that. This market is maturing in Canada and in the U.S. as well.

That’s actually more interesting compared to bottom-line figures, like tax returns. A lot of these companies, especially at the early stage, are still EBITDA breakeven or negative. But if I can see the recurring revenue and map it out—over 12, 24, or 36 months—depending on the end markets, sector, revenue quality, contract size, and balance sheet, that’s where the opportunity lies.

For example, if you’ve just raised $50 million and have a decent recurring revenue base, you will be able to access this type of financing. That's how it works.

Convincing someone to sell their company

There was a situation with a client of a bank’s wealth management division where we convinced them to sell their company. You sit down with them and ask, "What's your succession plan?" For the longest time, this person was grooming their kids to take over the business. But then you have to point out, "Listen, they’re not interested. One is doing something else, and the other has a different focus."

You also remind them not to miss the window of opportunity. You don’t want them to start pulling back gradually, which can lead to value erosion. It's important to sell while they’re still actively engaged—talking to customers and visiting them.

You have to frame it from both a personal wealth management perspective and their stage in life. They're at a point where they want to enjoy their wealth. It's tough because people often think, "If I hold on for another five years, the value will be $100 million or $300 million." Nobody wants to leave money on the table.

It’s about identifying the right time to sell. Rather than trying to push them, it’s better to build trust. Ask them, "Would you give me permission to casually socialize with some potential buyers to see what they’d pay for the company?"

If they trust you, they might say, "Go for it." You don’t even need to sign an engagement letter at this stage because the relationship is built on trust. Then you can come back and say, "I talked to five buyers, and three of them are willing to offer." Ask for their permission to share the numbers.

Once they’re on board, you can sign the engagement letter and start preparing a high-level teaser with basic numbers. Share it with a targeted group and ask for IOIs (Indications of Interest).

This is not a "spray and pray" approach where you send out 500 teasers. It’s a targeted strategy aimed at those who are most likely to see value in the company. This approach combines reaching out to strategic buyers and private equity firms that may have relevant portfolio companies where the business could fit as an elegant tuck-in.

So, it’s more like testing the waters, not a hard sell, but just exploring what’s out there. It’s price discovery. You might think the company is worth $175 million, but then you find buyers willing to put in $250 million. At that point, you’ve really captured their attention, and they’re ready to move forward.

How growth impacts valuation and attracts buyers

If you can scale and grow consistently at scale, that's great. There’s the year-over-year growth, but there’s also a need for some history behind it to instill confidence. 

It’s very analytical. You break it down into net new customers, or "new logos." Then you analyze the upselling to existing customers. For example, a client might start with just your M&A module and later decide to add other products because they see value and stickiness in your offerings. Even if they don’t use all of the features, they see enough benefit to invest more deeply.

Metrics like new logos, upsells, and your ability to expand within existing accounts show how well you execute your strategy. At scale, table stakes are 20% to 30% growth. If you're at a billion-dollar valuation and growing at 20%, you’ll command a premium valuation.

It’s about assessing the quality of the growth, such as the number of new logos and the increase in retention revenue. The size of the business also matters. 

In terms of categorizing growth stages, in my opinion, the first $10 million is the hardest, especially going from $5 million to $10 million. But if you can get from $10 million to $25 million and then to $50 million, you attract a new set of potential buyers.

Hitting $20 million often opens the floodgates. Private equity firms stop seeing you as just an acquisition target and start viewing you as a potential platform.

You can also look at it in terms of EBITDA milestones. For instance, going from $1 million EBITDA to $5 million, and then to $10 million, makes a big difference. At $10 million, lenders may start offering $30 million based on 3x EBITDA, which can accelerate your growth.

It’s perfectly fine if part of that growth is inorganic because it demonstrates your ability to integrate other players into your organization. Some people worry that inorganic growth will be discounted, but it’s actually a rational part of the evaluation process.

I encourage companies in the $10 million range to explore smaller acquisitions. It helps build internal muscle memory and demonstrates value to potential buyers. Private equity firms often look for businesses with strong management teams capable of consolidation.

They might say, "We’ve been targeting this space for a while but haven’t found the right management." If your team can outline how to integrate acquisitions—deciding what to integrate and what to leave as standalone—you show them you can grow both organically and inorganically. At that point, they’re ready to invest.

How to approach your first acquisition

Let’s say I’m still growing organically and proving myself before hitting $20 million ARR and raising institutional money.

I had a real-life example with a company facing the same dilemma. I told them, "It’s time. We need to start doing acquisitions. Otherwise, it’s getting boring. Our product is great, but we need to go beyond what we’re currently doing."

I went to the sales team and asked, "Are you cross-selling with anyone?" They said, "Yes, we’re cross-selling with this platform." I asked, "What do they do?" They explained, "They provide this solution and sell it along with our equipment."

I probed further, "Are they just a sales company?" They replied, "No, they also have a proprietary front-end with a UI and dashboard. Their business model is SaaS." I asked about their size, and they said, "It’s a bootstrapped company with about 15 people, and we know them well."

I dug deeper: "How well do you know them?" They said, "We’re best buddies. We’ve worked together on 90% of their deals." That was the intelligence I needed.

In the next internal meeting, I brought in the CEO and CTO. I said, "You know this company?" They responded, "Oh, we love those guys. We hang out after every trade conference." Then I said, "Well, here’s your first acquisition."

They were surprised but quickly saw the value. It was seamless. We went from being a telco equipment company to acquiring a SaaS business with a completely different gross margin profile. The market loved it, and integration was smooth. The acquired team was relieved—they didn’t have to worry about payroll or IT anymore. It was perfect.

That’s the first approach: find a company you already have a relationship with, especially if you’ve been cross-selling with them.

The second approach is a standalone, non-integrated geographic acquisition in a region where you’re comfortable operating. I’ve had great experiences with this, especially in Northern Europe—countries like Finland, Sweden, and the Netherlands.

One of my best acquisitions was in the Netherlands. It was a perfect standalone operation. We didn’t lead with integration or layoffs. Instead, we let them run their business while exploring cross-selling opportunities over time.

This wasn’t about forcing synergies but allowing things to happen organically. Eventually, we started selling each other’s products. It worked perfectly.

For a first acquisition, start by asking your sales team who they’re working with. That’s how you build your pipeline in a corporate setting.

How to pitch a deal to Founders

When pitching a deal to founders, the first step is understanding their pain points. Ask them what they dislike about their business. If there are operational challenges or specific tasks they hate, highlight how your team can take those over, making their lives easier. This approach helps you position the acquisition as a relief, especially if there’s founder fatigue or investor fatigue involved.

You’re essentially offering them an out, saying, “We can give you an exit and bring you into something bigger.” At the same time, you need to show them how they can still benefit from the growth of your company. This could involve structuring a hybrid deal with an upfront cash payment and allowing them to roll over a portion of their equity—say 20% to 30%—into your company. This aligns interests and lets them participate in the future upside of the combined business.

For founders who have been bootstrapping for years and need liquidity, this type of structure gives them some immediate financial freedom while letting them stay involved in the growth journey.

In cases where a hybrid deal isn’t feasible—perhaps due to investor concerns about unequal treatment of the upside—you can propose a full sale. Key employees who join your company can be brought into your employee stock option plan (ESOP), giving them new employment agreements with stock options aligned with your senior executives. This allows them to share in the upside as part of the new team.

Additionally, structuring the deal as an asset purchase can be advantageous. It lets you pick and choose the assets you want, leaving behind liabilities and potential unknown risks. By doing this, you cleanly integrate the people and assets that will drive future growth without worrying about hidden problems.

Navigating deals with difficult CEOs

In some deals, you encounter a CEO who becomes a significant challenge. You always start with the intent to close the deal, but sometimes, during the process, you realize this individual might be disruptive to your culture. At that point, you have to assess if the deal can proceed with or without them.

If the CEO is blocking the deal but the investors want to sell, it all depends on who has control. Let me share an example. About 15 years ago, I was working on a buy-side M&A deal for a company in Spain. It was a fantastic business with strong cross-selling potential. 

We arranged a meeting with the CEO in Madrid and asked if they’d like to be part of our company. The CEO responded, "Who gave you the impression that I’m selling my company?"

It turned out to be a lifestyle business. The company was profitable and stable, with no urgency to sell. However, the cap table showed three VCs who had been invested for nine years. Typically, VCs operate on a 10-year fund cycle, and they start thinking about exits by year eight.

I contacted one of the VC partners and introduced myself. I explained our interest in acquiring the company. The VC asked, "Have you spoken to the CEO?" I told him we had, but the CEO wasn’t open to the idea. The VC then said, "Let’s fly to Spain together and handle this." We flew into Barcelona and took the train to Madrid. 

The VC partner made it clear: "This isn’t the CEO’s company; it’s ours." We went to the company unannounced, and the CEO was taken aback. The VC confronted him directly, stating, "You’re not aligned with the vision for this company."

From there, the VCs directed us to create a plan for transferring intellectual property and managing the business without the CEO. This wasn’t a public company hostile takeover, but it was similar in nature—a situation where the investors took control of the process.

We had to be very careful. We ensured strict non-solicitation agreements were in place and accounted for the legal complexities of operating in a European jurisdiction. Unlike North America, where laws are more familiar, European regulations required additional considerations.

Ultimately, we moved forward by preparing a non-binding offer subject to due diligence. This allowed the VCs to proceed confidently, even without the CEO’s cooperation. It was a challenging scenario, but with the right investor support, we successfully navigated it.

And then our biggest risk assessment there was, how do we manage the key customers? Because the key customers were in Europe. How do we make sure that these key customers don't go anywhere? 

The beauty is there weren't that many companies in the space and for people to switch to a new technology was very hard. How do I get access to the cap table? Do I just ask one of the investors for it? No, you can't. I basically reached out to that VC because he was on the board. So I just said, “Hey, you're an investor in this company. We were thinking of acquiring it. So you've been in for nine years.”

In a lot of the cases, there could be shareholder agreements where they say that if an exit doesn't happen, it's X number of years, they have the ability to influence that outcome. So definitely they do have some kind of an influence. And we took care of all the employees, by the way, and it was a severance and all that kind of stuff. Good outcome? Good outcome. Fully integrated. 

Challenges in carve-outs from the buy-side

Technically, I have not completed a carve-out from the buy side, but I’ve tried unsuccessfully to socialize the idea with large conglomerates several times. Carve-outs are all about unlocking value within a company. 

For example, let’s say you’re in the trucking business. You’ve built a proprietary software platform to manage your fleet operations. The question becomes: can that platform be spun out into its own business?

To do this, you’d need a dedicated salesforce to sell the scheduling and lead management software to external customers. That’s the kind of opportunity where value could be unlocked. However, when I’ve approached large conglomerates in the past, suggesting they spin off such businesses, the primary challenge has been how intertwined these operations are.

They might say, "Sure, you can take this business out, but what happens to the people and resources currently supporting it?" Often, companies lack the urgency to act unless there’s an external trigger, like regulatory pressure.

Regulations are frequently the catalyst for carve-outs. For example, regulators might tell two merging companies, "You need to sell off this part of the business." That’s when a full-blown exercise begins. Consultants are brought in to assess what’s needed to operate the carved-out unit as a standalone business.

For instance, you can’t allocate 25% of the group CFO’s time to the new business. Instead, you’ll need to hire a dedicated CFO. Similarly, technology infrastructure becomes critical. If your ERP systems are shared, the carved-out entity must set up its own ERP system, essentially building an entirely new company from scratch.

In some cases, carve-outs or spin-outs are even prepared to go public. In Canada, for instance, you’re required to provide three years of standalone historical financials in a prospectus. This means you need to recreate financials as if the business had operated independently during that period.

When planning a carve-out, you also need to anticipate and model transitional service agreements (TSAs) and buffers for unexpected costs. For example, technology expenses might be underestimated because the new entity won’t have the same purchasing scale as the parent company. Ultimately, creating a standalone organization requires thorough planning and consideration of all the missing pieces that must be built.

Networking to find carve-out deals

If large companies are organized and disciplined, they typically go through periodic exercises—annually or every couple of years—to identify what’s core to their business and what’s not. This process often reveals orphan products or non-core divisions that are candidates for spin-offs.

To start networking for carve-out deals, you should focus on CFOs and, to a lesser extent, corporate development (CorpDev) teams. While CorpDev teams are often concentrated on acquisitions, they may also flag divestitures resulting from mergers or internal reviews. 

For example, following a merger, spin-outs often occur within eight months. That’s when you should be ready with a fully financed deal, an efficient due diligence process, and the ability to acquire assets at a good value.

When approaching CorpDev or CFOs, your pitch should clearly state that you have access to capital and are actively looking to acquire companies with specific metrics. Highlight your focus on businesses with recurring revenue, attractive gross margins, and an ability to carve out customer bases cleanly. Make it clear that your deal is not subject to financing, though it will require customary due diligence.

Additionally, working with buy-side bankers can help facilitate introductions and negotiations. Buy-side bankers act on your behalf, helping you identify and approach targets. While you’ll pay fees for their services, their expertise often results in more efficient deal-making.

In some cases, you can also approach industry contacts or bankers informally and say, “I’m interested in this particular business because I don’t think they’re doing much with it.” They might be able to reach out on your behalf and explore opportunities.

Structuring optimal deals for carve-outs and founder-owned businesses

Step one in structuring a deal is determining the motivations of the core team. Are they willing and comfortable transitioning to a new environment? This is especially important in carve-outs, where cultural alignment and operational fit are critical.

For instance, I once visited a company and quickly realized the culture of their team would never align with the client I represented. I advised them to raise capital and become an independent company instead of merging with a larger conglomerate. This approach ensured that their team stayed motivated and avoided misalignment issues.

When negotiating deal structures—whether for a carve-out or a founder-owned business—it’s crucial to align terms with the stakeholders’ needs. A typical structure might involve dividing the purchase price into three parts: upfront cash, financing terms, and rollover equity. Each component appeals to different priorities.

For external investors—like venture capitalists who have been in the business for nine years—their priority will usually be cash. They want to close their fund and avoid the complexities of managing rolled-over equity or waiting for future liquidity events. They’d prefer as much cash upfront as possible.

For bootstrap founders, it’s a different story. You need to sell the dream. This means showing them the vision of your company and the potential upside of rolling over equity. If they’re going to roll over 50% of their equity into your company, they’ll want to know how and when they can monetize it.

You need to provide a clear plan, which could include a timeline for a public offering or other liquidity events. For example, you could say, “We’re planning to go public in 12 to 18 months, and this could be the valuation of the company.” 

While you can’t make guarantees, you can outline hypothetical scenarios to illustrate the potential benefits of taking stock. However, sellers typically view rolled-over equity as the "gravy"—an additional upside. Most will still want to monetize as much as they can upfront. 

If your company has clear near-term visibility for a liquidity event, founders and shareholders might decide internally that taking stock is worth it because of the potential upside. On the other hand, if you don’t plan to go public or sell, you need to be transparent about that. 

Founders will likely push for all-cash deals in such scenarios because they won’t see a clear path to liquidity for their equity.

The more near term options for liquidity, the easier it is for you to pitch equity and the stock in the company.

If you can show that in two years, there's going to be liquidity, you would recap the business and be able to take them off.

It's an IPO candidate, for example. Frankly, like if you can get everything you want as a private company, I would stay private.

There are a lot of regulatory costs. There are, of course, significant pros to going public, but there are also cons to going public. 

When to take on investments and build a platform

If there’s no urgency to take out cash, you have the freedom to make strategic decisions about how and when to raise capital. Taking on minority shareholders means giving up a degree of freedom—shareholders often have veto rights over major expenses, which could limit your ability to use company funds freely.

In your situation, the key consideration is whether you feel confident that your product won’t become obsolete or lose market share. If the business is sticky, stable, and growing organically, and you’re having a good time running it, there’s no immediate need to sell equity or dilute ownership.

However, when you’re ready to scale aggressively, acquisitions in other geographies can be a fun and strategic next step. If you’ve already covered every city in North America, expanding to markets like Paris, Stockholm, Oslo, or Copenhagen can bring exciting growth opportunities.

From my perspective, your platform is solid and stable. You can focus on building a network of like-minded CEOs and entrepreneurs, especially those who are bootstrapped. Founder-to-founder chats can build trust, give these entrepreneurs some liquidity, and bring them into your fold. Together, you can hit milestones like $20 million ARR, then $50 million ARR, and eventually a billion-dollar enterprise value.

The playbook here is about socializing your vision with others, making them part of your journey, and leveraging shared best practices to accelerate growth. With each acquisition, you’re fostering a family-like culture where everyone feels aligned with the long-term goal.

When you reach a certain point, you’ll have options: a full exit, retirement, or passing the reins to younger leaders groomed from within your acquisitions. This approach not only builds value but also ensures your legacy continues.

Focusing on creating a platform for entrepreneurs fosters growth, enables cross-selling opportunities, and ensures long-term value creation. It’s about taking what you’ve learned and applying it across the board, even in markets like Europe, where traditional marketing may be undervalued. It’s your playbook to scale and thrive.

Key differences between buy-side and sell-side M&A

On the sell side, the process is very transactional. As a sell-side banker, you work with the shareholders of the company being sold to maximize value. Your role is to identify buyers who will pay a premium price for the asset. Strategics might place higher value on the company because of synergies, such as cross-selling opportunities.

The focus is on ensuring any offers are credible and fully financed. For instance, if a buyer says their offer is subject to financing, it’s crucial to verify if they can raise the necessary capital. This involves checking their funding sources and challenging them to provide proof, such as bank contacts or funder confirmations. 

If they claim internal approval is required, you need to map out the process: when the board will meet, how the resolution will look, and whether existing covenants or debt facilities might be impacted.

On the buy side, the emphasis is entirely different. It’s not just about making the acquisition but ensuring that it delivers on the intended value post-close. Financial metrics are the baseline, but you must consider whether the acquisition aligns with your product roadmap, cross-selling strategies, and overall business goals.

For example, if part of the value proposition is cross-selling the acquired company’s product to German clients, you need a clear action plan for execution. It’s essential to involve the team that will own and manage the new business unit and ensure their buy-in.

Standalone, non-integrated acquisitions are simpler—for example, buying a European "Expedia" to expand market share without integration. But if the acquisition involves integration within North America, the stakes are much higher. Detailed planning is required to ensure alignment across IT systems, ERP platforms, and security frameworks. These areas can involve significant costs and risks, especially if overlooked.

The buy side is heavily focused on post-acquisition considerations. You need a strong integration team and a detailed plan to align the acquisition with your company’s strategy. Whether it’s people, IT systems, or security, every aspect must be scrutinized to avoid unexpected costs and ensure the acquisition drives value.

In summary, sell-side work is about maximizing value and ensuring credible offers, while buy-side work focuses on post-acquisition integration and achieving strategic objectives. Both require thorough diligence but differ in their priorities and outcomes.

Surprises and lessons learned in M&A

Surprises in M&A often come from unexpected circumstances during diligence, integration, or even post-acquisition. For example, I’ve seen situations where non-compete agreements expired, and individuals were ready to act the moment they could. 

But the most significant surprise I encountered was a deal where the acquisition didn’t make sense after the market shifted. We acquired a company with the intention of cross-selling its content, but the market for that content disappeared. 

The entire thesis of the deal was based on leveraging their platform for cross-selling, and when that didn’t materialize, the deal had to be written off. 

It became a case of overestimating the strategic value, and we ended up treating the acquisition as an expensive customer acquisition cost.

In another instance, deals didn’t succeed because the rationale was too speculative or poorly integrated. 

But over time, M&A has become far more disciplined and sophisticated. We’re seeing fewer impulsive acquisitions like AOL-Time Warner, which aimed to combine the best content company with the internet but failed spectacularly. 

On the other hand, deals like Google’s acquisition of YouTube demonstrate how a controversial move can turn into a revenue-generating powerhouse. People initially doubted the deal, citing challenges like copyright issues, monetization, and content moderation. Yet today, YouTube is one of the most valuable platforms in the world.

The sophistication of M&A today is remarkable. Many organizations now have M&A as a core function, whether it’s a corporate development team or someone specifically tasked with monitoring acquisitions and potential targets. Even private equity firms are investing in dedicated resources to track acquisition opportunities for their portfolio companies.

The talent pool driving M&A has also evolved. It’s no longer just finance professionals crunching numbers. Today’s teams include people from diverse backgrounds—product, sales, senior management, and even founders—who bring unique perspectives to M&A strategies. This diversity ensures that acquisitions align with product roadmaps and business objectives.

One of the best buy-side experiences I had involved working with a CTO and head of product to evaluate the gaps in our product roadmap. We used a "buy versus build" approach to determine where acquisitions made sense. It was a strategic and collaborative effort, and none of the core team members were from a finance background, aside from myself.

This approach ensures the acquisitions fit seamlessly into the company’s broader goals, making integration smoother and value creation more effective. When the team driving the acquisition is deeply involved in the product roadmap, they’re also better equipped to lead the integration and execute on the value drivers.

M&A today is about assembling the right skills, having a clear strategy, and ensuring that every deal is backed by thorough analysis and long-term vision. It’s exciting to see how the field has evolved to include such a multidimensional approach.

How M&A strategies have evolved

Things are becoming much more strategic and aligned with corporate strategy. While there will always be one-off opportunities—like when a piece of a conglomerate goes up for sale—the majority of M&A strategies today are well-structured. CorpDev teams are focusing on short-term, medium-term, and long-term strategies.

These teams have clear growth plans, combining organic and inorganic strategies, and are organized in how they execute. Companies doing M&A well, like PayPal, Booking.com, and Carta, understand what pieces they need to drive value and aren’t afraid to take risks. They see an opportunity—like a functionality they can offer to their existing clients—and make the investment because otherwise, those clients might look elsewhere.

Another trend is companies with strong balance sheets making minority investments in potential future targets. 

For instance, big firms like Salesforce, Microsoft, Google, and Thomson Reuters have venture capital arms. They invest in fintech or innovative startups that might be too early-stage to acquire but could become targets later. These minority investments allow them to participate in the upside while maintaining flexibility to fully acquire the company in the future.

Back in the 80s and 90s, M&A was very transactional—suits, ties, and straightforward deals. Today, it’s about building relationships and engaging with the innovation ecosystem. While transactions are still part of it, the approach is now multi-pronged and less transactional.

It’s like we’re looking at strategies from different angles and making calculated bets. The focus should be on medium- and long-term shareholder value. But at the same time, you need to be ready to act on opportunities when they arise. That’s where having a playbook, muscle memory, and the ability to quickly pull together the right team becomes crucial.